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There is no virtue like necessity.
–WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II act 1, sc. 3.

INTRODUCTION
Did the longest government shutdown in United States history this past
winter constitute a severe threat to a functioning and independent federal
judiciary? In short, yes.
From the vantage point of a district court’s chambers, we experienced
firsthand the uncertainty that almost weakened the federal judiciary when
Congress and the President were at odds over the budget, threatening the
judicial branch of the government with shrinkage or closure. This Essay asserts
a viable legal theory—we call it a “theory of necessity”1—to prevent any
† Michael M. Baylson, B. Sc. in Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1961; LL.B., University
of Pennsylvania Law School, 1964; United States District Court Judge, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Elizabeth Coyne, B.A., University of Delaware, 2008; J.D., Temple University Law
School, 2016. Martha Guarnieri, B.A., Rutgers University, 2010; J.D., Temple University Law
School, 2017. Samantha Weiss, B.A., Georgetown University, 2012; J.D., University of Pennsylvania
Law School, 2017. Mses. Coyne, Guarnieri, and Weiss are currently law clerks to Judge Baylson.
1 A theory of necessity is recognized in several areas of the law, including bankruptcy, taxation,
and criminal law. See, e.g., Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 972 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a
criminal defendant may assert the “doctrine of necessity” as an aﬃrmative defense under Florida
state law to challenge a charge of ﬂeeing the police), cert. denied, No. 18-6908, 2019 WL 1590272
(U.S. Apr. 15, 2019); In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (explaining
that, in bankruptcy cases, the equitable “Doctrine of Necessity” aims to balance Chapter 11’s goals
of paying pre-petition creditors with treating all creditors equally). A previous law review note
proposed that “state courts should invoke inherent power against a legislature only under a standard
of absolute necessity to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law.” Andrew
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constitutional crisis caused by a future government shutdown. This theory
invokes four building blocks of well-established legal doctrines that, when
connected, pave a path to secure the judicial branch’s autonomy. The theory of
necessity requires the legislative and executive branches to recognize their
constitutional obligations to fund the judicial branch, without interruption.
These four building block doctrines are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The inherent power of courts to require the legislative
and executive branches of government to provide reasonable
and necessary funding;
The Take Care Clause of the United States Constitution requiring
the President to enforce the laws, which surely include the laws
establishing lower federal courts and their jurisdiction;
Holding the Antideﬁciency Act unconstitutional as applied to the
judiciary during a government shutdown; and
A legislative or mandamus remedy, to apply these principles
eﬀectively and appropriately against both Congress and the
Executive, if necessary.

In analyzing the constitutional issues presented by a shutdown of the
judiciary, these well-established principles are attracted to each other, as how
Mozart’s Papageno is attracted to Papagena. The concept of the United
States’ judicial system terminating its operations because of a political dispute
between the executive and legislative branches requires adoption of this
theory of necessity—that when threatened with a cessation of funds, the
judiciary can take action to protect its independence and its continued
functioning as a separate branch of government.
Of course, the word “necessary” is found in the text of the Constitution.
Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Oﬃcer thereof.”2 In the
constitutional law context, “necessity” is often referenced when evaluating

W. Yates, Note, Using Inherent Judicial Power in a State-Level Budget Dispute, 62 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1463
(2013) (emphasis added). What we advocate is that the concept of reasonable necessity protects the
autonomy of federal courts in a government shutdown.
2 Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of this clause was the subject of Federalist Paper No. 33.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). The concept of necessity was central to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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the power of the President or Congress to act in the face of a national
emergency.3 As Thomas Jeﬀerson explained:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of
a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of selfpreservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.
To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to
lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying
them with us; thus absurdly sacriﬁcing the end to the means.4

From a federal trial judge’s point of view, the concept of a shutdown
impacting the judicial branch is utterly inconsistent with what we practice
and preach every day in our opinions and courtrooms, whether in a simple
personal injury case based on diversity or a complex federal question dispute.
Therefore, we see our building block approach as providing the much-desired
solution, and one which serves to rightfully insulate the administration of
justice from those unnecessary failures of governance.
I. BACKGROUND: THE 2019 SHUTDOWN
On December 22, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced a partial
government shutdown in response to disagreements with Congress over the
2019 appropriations bill. The shutdown affected over 800,000 federal
employees and lasted for thirty-five days, making it the longest shutdown in
United States history.5 During the funding lapse, the work of many
government agencies came to a halt. The federal judiciary was threatened by
the impasse but was able to use nonappropriated funds—comprised mainly of
court fees—to continue most judicial functions from December 22, 2018
through February 1, 2019.6 Similar shutdowns of varying lengths have occurred
3 See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781,
781-87 (2013) (describing the Obama administration’s decision not to enforce removal provisions of
an immigration law and arguing that the “Take Care Clause imposes on the President a duty to
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases”).
4 Id. at 817 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)).
5 Lisa Rein, Tracy Jan & Kimberly Kindy, Federal Employees Return to Backlog of Work After
35-Day Shutdown, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federalemployees-return-to-backlog-of-work-after-35-day-shutdown/2019/01/28/10030766-231c-11e9-81fdb7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.abf9970eddf5 [https://perma.cc/A268-RRML].
6 Through a series of eleven memoranda, James Duﬀ, Director of the Administrative Oﬃce of
the United States Courts (AO), updated judges, court staﬀ, and federal defender oﬃces about the
ability of the judiciary to function during the partial government shutdown. Duﬀ communicated
that funding would extend only though February 1, 2019, but that essential court operations could
continue thereafter. See Judiciary Has Funds to Operate Through Jan. 31, UNITED STATES COURTS
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since 1980; most notably, a 1995–96 shutdown that lasted twenty-one days
under President Clinton and a 2013 shutdown that lasted seventeen days under
President Obama. No shutdown in history, however, has come so close to
threatening the continued functioning of the federal judiciary as the most
recent shutdown. The chambers of the authors of this Essay, Judge Michael
Baylson and his law clerks, experienced the effects of the shutdown first-hand.
In United States v. Hoover, a complex, nine-defendant narcotics conspiracy case,
several defense counsel insisted on a trial within the time limits of the Speedy
Trial Act (STA).7 The Assistant United States Attorney represented on the
record that the Government was unable to comply with the court’s discovery
deadlines because of the shutdown.8 As a result, the court had no choice but to
delay the deadline for production of important discovery material to all defense
counsel. If the shutdown had continued, the consequences, like the proverbial
tumbling domino blocks, may have required dismissal of the charges because of
the Government’s failure to produce discovery.9
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF NECESSITY
The shutdown ended on January 25, 2019, just days before the judicial
branch would have depleted the funds necessary to perform its
constitutionally-mandated duties. That a political battle between the
executive and legislative branches could cripple the judicial branch’s ability to
adjudicate disputes constitutes a breach of the principle of separation of
powers that is fundamental to the United States Constitution and echoed in
state constitutions. This Essay argues that the executive and legislative
branches not only have the power, but also the duty, to ensure that the judicial
branch has reasonable and necessary funds. This theory of necessity compels
judges to advocate for funds, through litigation if necessary, to ensure
continued operations in the face of future threats to annual appropriations.
A. Under Common Law Principles, Courts Have Inherent Power to
Ensure Their Continued Operations
The judicial branch has the inherent power to require the legislative and
executive branches to provide reasonable and necessary funds to function as
a separate and independent branch of government. This inherent power—the
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/01/22/judiciary-has-funds-operate-throughjan-31 [https://perma.cc/DF7A-B7MU].
7 No. 18-249 (E.D. Pa. ﬁled Oct. 17, 2018 ).
8 Transcript of Record at 18-25, United States v. West, No. 18-249-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2019) (“Your
Honor, the Government . . . ha[s] not been able to meet the . . . deadline . . . . [O]ur litigation support
staff and IT people have been furloughed, and we cannot . . . process [cellphone evidence] without them.”).
9 See infra note 22 (describing the STA and cases where it was used to vacate convictions).
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ﬁrst of our four building blocks—is a function of the separation of powers
doctrine fundamental to our system of government and embodied in both the
United States Constitution and state constitutions.
The idea that the judiciary has the inherent power to maintain its
existence is an established legal doctrine. Several state supreme courts have
strongly endorsed this principle by requiring the legislative and executive
bodies of state governments to provide “reasonable and necessary” funds for
the operation of their state court systems. In the following pages, we refer to
litigation in state supreme courts which precipitated from stubborn
interbranch conﬂict and which required a judicial resolution. These state
court decisions have clearly and consistently enforced the principles that state
appropriating bodies have an obligation to provide the judiciary with
“reasonable and necessary” funds as opposed to a blank check; that depriving
courts of such funds for their proper functioning is contrary to the doctrine
of separation of powers; and, most importantly, that courts have inherent
power to compel governing bodies to appropriate those funds.
Again, we draw on the personal experience of the lead author of this Essay,
Judge Michael Baylson, who, as a young lawyer with the Philadelphia ﬁrm of
Duane, Morris & Heckscher in 1970, drafted the complaint in a successful
mandamus action brought by the President Judge of Philadelphia’s Common
Pleas Court against the Mayor and City Council of Philadelphia.10 This
action has played a key role in the development of this theory of necessity.
In Carroll v. Tate, the City Council’s failure to appropriate necessary funds
prompted the ﬁling. After a non-jury trial, Judge Harry A. Montgomery,
sitting by designation, issued a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania aﬃrmed, and stated:
Unless the Legislature can be compelled by the Courts to provide the money
which is reasonably necessary for the proper functioning and administration
of the Courts, our entire Judicial system could be extirpated, and the
Legislature could make a mockery of our form of Government with its three
co-equal branches—the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial.11

Following remand by the state supreme court, the City entered into a
settlement agreement supplying additional funds for court operations,
demonstrating that the judiciary’s inherent power to enforce the separation
of powers can be an eﬀective legal tool to secure reasonable and necessary
funding for the federal judiciary.12
See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
Id. at 199 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431).
Pennsylvania state courts, following Carroll, have emphasized that legislative action that
impairs the independence of the judiciary would be contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers.
10
11
12
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More recently, a Michigan trial court sought to compel two county funding
units to appropriate funds for enhanced pension and retiree health plans, as
necessary to recruit and maintain staff to carry out the court’s essential
functions.13 The lower court found in favor of the plaintiff Trial Court in part
because the funds were “reasonable and necessary” to its ability to perform its
constitutional duties; the appellate court affirmed.14 Under this “reasonable
and necessary” doctrine, as outlined by the court, “in those rare instances in
which the legislature’s allocation of resources impacts the ability of the judicial
branch to carry out its constitutional responsibilities, what is otherwise
exclusively a part of the legislative power becomes, to that extent, a part of the
judicial power.”15 In support of this proposition, the court referenced a
relevant observation by James Madison, connecting the state court’s power to
compel reasonable and necessary funds to the federal government:
[M]embers of each department should be as little dependent as possible
on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their oﬃces . . . .
As the legislat[ure] . . . alone has access to the pockets of the people, and
has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing inﬂuence over
the pecuniary rewards of those who will ﬁll the other departments, a
dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to
encroachments of the former.16

Although ultimately upholding the principle in crafting its judicial test,
the court determined that the plaintiﬀ had failed to establish that the beneﬁts
requested were “reasonable and necessary” to the “serviceability” of the court.17
New York and Ohio state courts have similarly recognized that in failing
to allocate sufficient funds for the judiciary to carry out its functions, the
legislature or appropriating body violates the constitutional principle of separation

See, e.g., Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. 1996)
(per curiam) (quoting McCulloch and holding that a writ of mandamus to require the General Assembly
to enact a funding scheme that would provide necessary financial support for state courts was
warranted); Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1982) (citing Carroll and requiring county
commissioners to provide funding for court staff and salary increases for court-related personnel
and noting “the judiciary’s inherent power to compel expenditures necessary to prevent the
impairment of its exercise of the judicial power or of the proper administration of justice”).
13 46th Cir. Trial Court v. Crawford Cty., 719 N.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Mich. 2006).
14 Id. at 558.
15 Id. at 560.
16 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 48 (James Madison)).
17 Id. at 569.
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of powers.18 Notably, New York’s highest court has suggested that the judiciary
has the authority to require appropriations for court-appointed counsel.19
These principles have not yet been applied in the context of a federal
government shutdown, but in this increasingly divisive political climate, they
should be. The strategies employed by litigants in state courts provide just a
few examples of how federal courts could preserve their autonomy in the face
of a future executive–legislative tug-of-war. The common law doctrine of
courts’ inherent power to secure funding is fundamental to the building
blocks for which we advocate to insulate the federal judiciary from the
detrimental eﬀects of a shutdown.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized these same concerns during
the 1995 shutdown, when he requested that Congress “separate the judiciary’s
budget from the comprehensive appropriation for Commerce, Justice, State,
and the Judiciary, of which it is traditionally a part.”20 Chief Justice
Rehnquist recognized that
the judiciary is not part of the law-making process, and nothing in the
judiciary’s budget involves any dispute of principle between Congress and
the President . . . . There is simply no reason for depriving the public of any
part of the function which the judicial branch performs because of disputes
between the executive and legislative branches with respect to other agencies
included in the larger appropriation bill.21

We agree.
The concept of separation of powers warrants application of a theory of
necessity to protect the federal judiciary from legislative curtailment.22 The
18 Ascione v. City of New York, 379 N.Y.S.2d 599, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (“Included in
this concept [of separation of powers] is the obvious caveat that the ‘appropriating body’ must
appropriate sufficient funds for all three branches of government to carry out its functions.”);
State ex rel. Rudes v. Rofkar, Nos. OT-83-14, OT-83-15, OT-83-16, 1983 WL 6971, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 14, 1983) (“Because an independent court system is the mainstay of the rule of law in
a free society, co-ordinate branches of the government may not fiscally restrain or hamper the
courts in effectively discharging their sundry judicial responsibilities.”); see, e.g., Kelch v. Town
Bd. of Davenport, 829 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that town’s legislative
action in setting a justice’s salary at $500 per year violated the principles of separation of powers
and judicial independence embodied in the New York and United States constitutions).
19 Hurrell-Herring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. 2010) (reversing a lower court ruling that
the state’s requirement that counties fund indigent defense with county resources was non-justiciable
and noting that “[i]t [was], of course, possible that a remedy . . . would necessitate the appropriation
of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of legislative priorities”).
20 See William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 19 A M . J.
T RIAL A DVOC . 491, 492 (1996).
21 Id.
22 The STA provides one example of federal courts recognizing that the concept of separation
of powers may act to limit legislative action. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106,
1109-11 (D. Md. 1977)(citing Carroll and relying on the Federalist Papers and the court’s “inherent
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judicial branch must be able to function eﬀectively as a check on its
counterparts while fulﬁlling its role as adjudicator. With this foundation,
when courts are threatened with loss of reasonably necessary funding for their
continued operations, they have the right—if not the obligation—to exercise
their inherent power to require that funds be provided. These cases, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s petition to Congress, establish the ﬁrst building
block of our theory—that federal courts have the inherent authority to do
what is necessary (i.e., seek mandamus, demand funds from Congress, etc.)
to maintain their existence.23
B. The Take Care Clause Requires the President to
Protect Judicial Functioning
Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that the
President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” creates “the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty.”24 This clause, known
as the Take Care Clause, is the second building block in our theory of
necessity. We argue that the Take Care Clause requires the President, in the
event of a government shutdown, to ensure the continued functioning of the
judicial system. Surely, the laws establishing lower federal courts are among
the “Laws” that fall within the President’s duty if and when the Legislature
fails to provide suﬃcient funds. The absence of any federal precedent in so
holding is not, in light of the common law principles discussed in Section
II.A, a bar to invoking the Take Care Clause in advocating for a theory of

power to preserve the eﬃcient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being
impaired or destroyed” in concluding that Congress’s imposition of a time limit in the STA oﬀended
the
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers),
aﬀ ’d,
590
F.2d
564
(4th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that there
was a question under the doctrine of separation of powers of whether Congress could “exercise
judicial authority” to the extent covered by the STA). The Fourth Circuit has since upheld the STA,
but the doctrine of separation of powers articulated in both Howard and Martinez remains
fundamental. See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the STA
was constitutional because the possibility that the STA would prevent the judicial branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions “would appear to be remote”); see also United
States v. Williams, 917 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2019) (applying the STA to vacate convictions); United
States v. Reese, 917 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2019) (same).
23 Prior scholarship has addressed the idea that courts, particularly state courts, have inherent
powers to ensure their own funding. E.g., G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial
Independence, the Power of the Purse, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12 (2004); William
S. Ferguson, Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 975 (1972);
Note, supra note 1. All three articles cite Carroll v. Tate. We draw from similar precedent as well as
our own experience in a federal trial judge’s chambers to apply the doctrine of inherent power in the
context of a federal shutdown.
24 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
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necessity to ensure the continued functioning of the judicial branch despite a
shutdown of the legislative and executive branches.25
The Take Care Clause is an untapped resource that can and should be
called upon to restore the constitutional balance emphasized by the Founders
in the event of a future shutdown. For example, Alexander Hamilton
recognized that the judiciary
will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution
. . . . [because it] has no inﬂuence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the eﬃcacy of its judgments.26

Alexis de Tocqueville appropriately observed during this country’s infancy
that the power of the President, unlike a monarch, “is also the executive of laws;
but he does not really co-operate in making them, since the refusal of his assent
does not prevent their passage. He is not, therefore, a part of the sovereign
power, but only its agent.”27 De Tocqueville’s view of the President as an
“agent” may not be his most perceptive prediction of the future given the
President’s executive powers. However, as there are very few Supreme Court
decisions examining how the Take Care Clause limits the President’s autonomy,
the notion that the President is an agent whose role, at least as to the judiciary,
is to “take Care that the [separation of powers principle] be faithfully executed”
remains a viable path toward preserving judicial autonomy.28
Indeed, the limits of a President’s authority to ignore the wishes of the
Legislature to further his or her own political agenda has recently been
challenged. President Trump’s February 2019 declaration of a national
emergency to secure border wall funding has spurred a ﬂurry of lawsuits
25 At least one federal court has explained that a violation of the Take Care Clause may
unconstitutionally interfere with separation of powers principles, acknowledging, to a degree, the
interplay between the ﬁrst and second building blocks. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp.
2d 714, 715, 724, 726 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citations omitted) (noting in a false patent marking action that if
31 U.S.C. § 292(b), which provides qui tam relator standing, violated the Take Care Clause by failing to
grant the executive branch sufficient control over litigation, “‘disrupt[ing] the proper balance between
the coordinate branches,’” the Supreme Court would strike the law as unconstitutional).
26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
27 A LEXIS DE T OCQUEVILLE, 1 D EMOCRACY IN A MERICA 124 (P. Bradley ed., Vintage
Books 1990) (1835).
28 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (holding
that President Truman had no constitutional authority to direct the Secretary of Commerce to
take possession of and operate the nation’s steel mills to avoid a “national emergency”); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (“The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress;
the power to execute in the President . . . . Both are servants of the people, whose will is
expressed in the fundamental law.”).
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challenging the President’s designation of funds to build a wall between the
United States and Mexico as violating the Constitution.29 The President has
some authority to determine the use of funds in the possession of the United
States Treasury for emergency measures, functioning of the military, law
enforcement, and public safety purposes, etc.30 However, the Spending Power
is exclusively vested with Congress,31 and the President may not write statutes
or alter those written by Congress.32
Court decisions have thus played an important role in adjudicating
disputes over presidential power. Just as there are precedents demonstrating
the courts’ ability to restrict unlimited presidential power, there have also
been instances where the President has enforced the authority of the
29 See, e.g., Complaint at 15-16, Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-0892 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019)
(alleging that temporary appropriations reinforce Congress’s constitutional duty to act as a check
upon the executive branch and that the Appropriations and Presentment Clauses prohibit the
President from modifying appropriations bills or drawing money from the Treasury in a manner
that undermines congressional appropriations). Demonstrating the constitutional limits on the
President’s autonomy, the Senate vetoed the President’s emergency declaration for the ﬁrst time in
history. Emily Cochrane & Glenn Thrush, Senate Rejects Trump’s Border Emergency Declaration, Setting
Up First Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/politics/
senate-vote-trump-national-emergency.html [https://perma.cc/AAS7-TMK7].
The question of whether the President’s directives to executive branch agencies to further
his or her own policy objectives violates the Take Care Clause has recently been raised. See Ariz.
DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 959, 975-76, 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming the
injunction against enforcement of Arizona’s policy of denying drivers’ licenses to Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients on the basis of preemption but noting that DACA did
not amount to a suspension of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in violation of the Take
Care Clause); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 135, 146 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming
injunction against enforcement of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (DAPA) based on a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act but
declining to address whether the Department of Homeland Security guidance implementing
DAPA violated the Take Care Clause), aff ’d mem. by an equally divided Court sub nom. United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). No court has ruled on this issue, leaving open the question
of the scope of the President’s regulatory power.
30 The President’s power to use emergency funds derives from several sources. See, e.g., 10
U.S.C. § 2808 (2012) (allowing the President to redirect federal appropriations in response to
an emergency declaration); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621–1622 (2012) (authorizing the President to
declare a national emergency).
31 Congress has very broad and exclusive powers under the Spending Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See generally City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing
City of Phila. v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 639-47 (E.D. Pa. 2017)) (acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has yet to define the outer bounds of the “relatedness” limit on Spending Clause
legislation but issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the Attorney General from enforcing
Byrne JAG grant conditions), aff ’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen., 916
F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019).
32 For instance, the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420, 438, 447-48 (1998) (writing for a 6–3 majority,
Justice Stevens explained that the President, unlike Congress, has no power “to enact, to amend, or
to repeal statutes,” and so the Act was unconstitutional because it gave “the President the unilateral
power to change the text of duly enacted statutes” in violation of Article I, § 7).
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judiciary. For example, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order33
requiring troops to facilitate desegregation in the Little Rock School District
pursuant to an order by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.34
In the same vein, although litigation challenging a shutdown as a violation
of the Take Care Clause is a new legal frontier, federal courts have invoked
the Take Care Clause when requiring the President to comply with court
orders, demonstrating the judiciary’s ability to protect its own authority while
enforcing the separation of powers doctrine. In Nixon v. Sirica, the President
argued that certain items requested in a grand jury subpoena, including
communications between him and his closest advisors related to his duties
under the Take Care Clause, were privileged.35 The district court ordered the
President to produce these items for in camera inspection, and a majority of
the D.C. Circuit aﬃrmed.36 In a later, related case, the Supreme Court
rejected the President’s argument that the independence of the executive
branch insulated him from a judicial subpoena issued during an ongoing
criminal prosecution.37 Such an absolute executive privilege, the Court held,
“would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and
gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.”38
These various precedents reﬂect substantial authority entrusted to the
judiciary to serve as a guiding force through uncharted terrain in the area
of separation of powers. They also suggest signiﬁcant power for selfpreservation of that authority. Vindicating such power would warrant a court
to require the President to continue funding the federal judiciary by ruling
that the judiciary is not to be aﬀected by any shutdown order.
Case law and pending litigation emphasizing the limits on the President’s
autonomy open the door to challenges that the President’s failure to sign an
appropriations bill would violate his or her duty to “take Care that the
[Constitution and the separation of powers principles therein] are faithfully
executed.” This is particularly true when the President uses that autonomy
to encroach upon the power of the courts. This embodies our second building
33 Initially, President Eisenhower issued a proclamation commanding that persons in Arkansas
cease and desist from willfully obstructing the enforcement of orders of the district court.
Proclamation No. 3204, 3 C.F.R. § 132 (1954–1958). When the proclamation was not obeyed, the
President authorized and directed the Secretary of Defense “to take all appropriate steps to enforce
any orders of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas” for the removal
of obstruction of justice. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. § 389 (1954–1958).
34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
35 487 F.2d 700, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
36 Id. at 704.
37 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-88, 706 (1974).
38 Id. at 707 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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block. While the checks and balances fundamental to the Constitution have
remained steadfast over time, the development of federal precedent and acts
of Congress has resulted in the creation of a strong executive branch over
which the President presides. But the President is not Wagner’s Wotan
leading his fellow gods, and the White House is not Valhalla.
C. The Antideﬁciency Act is Unconstitutional as
Applied to the Judiciary
The authority requiring federal agencies to “shut down” during a lapse in
appropriations derives from the Antideﬁciency Act,39 and administrative
guidance interpreting its text. Although the language of the Act arguably
applies to the federal government as a whole, the modern understanding of
how it should be applied during an appropriations impasse is limited almost
entirely to agencies within the executive branch. The Administrative Oﬃce
of the United States Courts (AO) has, in the past, chosen to follow that
agency guidance. However, if the judiciary is meant to be a separate and
independent branch of government, the Antideﬁciency Act cannot be applied
to constrain the courts in the same way it constrains executive agencies. This
is the third building block in our theory of necessity.
The Act specifies, among other things, that “an officer or employee of the
United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not
. . . make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available
in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.”40 The
government “may not accept voluntary services . . . or employ personal services
exceeding that authorized by law except for emergencies involving the safety of
human life or the protection of property.”41 In 1980 and 1981, Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti issued two opinions addressing the implications of the Act
during a lapse in appropriations.42 These opinions, particularly the 1981
Opinion, form the basis for executive branch decisions on how the federal
government may operate—or not operate—when a budget has not been enacted.43
31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1342 (2012).
Id. § 1341(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 1342.
Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11-12 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Opinion]; Applicability of the Antideficiency
Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriations, 4A Op. O.L.C. 16, 16 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Opinion].
43 The 1980 Opinion explains that the previous practice of working as if on credit during a
lapse in appropriations was unlawful under the Antideﬁciency Act, and the 1981 Opinion lessened
the blow by instructing that certain “essential” government services may continue to operate during
a shutdown. 1981 Opinion, supra note 42, at 11-12; 1980 Opinion, supra note 42, at 16. Civiletti’s
statement that “[t]he Constitution and the Antideﬁciency Act itself leave the Executive leeway to
perform essential functions and make the government ‘workable’” is the source from which the
government draws its distinctions between “essential” and “nonessential” workers during a
39
40
41
42
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Neither the Antideficiency Act nor the opinions of the Attorney General
expressly address or exempt the judiciary, and all of the official guidance on how
the Act should be applied is directed exclusively at the executive branch.44
Although the judiciary was able to operate for the duration of the 2013 and 2018–
19 shutdowns using nonappropriated funds, the AO recently issued guidelines
for all federal judges that would curtail operations under the terms of the
Antideficiency Act if a shutdown were to continue beyond the availability of
such funds. In that situation, each court would be responsible for determining
how to proceed and how to decide which staff are essential or nonessential.45
The resulting funding shortfall would be of concern not just to the
judiciary but assuredly to citizens and litigants as well. In June 1986, a
budgetary crisis, albeit not a “shutdown” as we use the term, prompted the
AO and the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference to issue a
memorandum to all district court judges requiring that they suspend civil jury
trials under the Antideﬁciency Act until necessary funds could be
reinstated.46 Following suits for emergency writs of mandamus by plaintiﬀs
in pending civil cases, the Ninth Circuit held in Armster v. District Court that
the wholesale suspension of the civil jury trial system was unconstitutional
but ultimately denied the petitions for mandamus relief.47 In light of its
reasoning on the unconstitutional nature of the suspension, the Ninth Circuit
expressed its “conﬁden[ce]” that the district court judges would “follow their
normal procedures and exercise their customary and reasonable judicial
discretion in scheduling and holding civil jury trials, and that they will do so
shutdown. See 1981 Opinion, supra note 42, at 11-12. Despite the fact that the 1980 and 1981 Opinions
do not oﬃcially apply to the judiciary, the federal courts have since operated during shutdowns in
the spirit of Civiletti’s guidance.
44 The Congressional Research Service has noted:
The DOJ opinions were written to guide actions in the executive branch. The
legislative and judicial branches are not guided oﬃcially by executive branch
documents regarding the Antideﬁciency Act. However, the two branches continue to
be guided by the Constitution and the act itself and may look to executive branch
guidelines as a point of reference.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 4 n.21 (2018).
45 Memorandum from James Duﬀ, Dir., Admin. Oﬃce of the U.S. Courts to All U.S. Judges
et al. (January 11, 2019). In its periodic memoranda on the availability of nonappropriated funds
through the 2018–19 shutdown, the AO also provided guidance about how courts should continue to
operate after funds became wholly unavailable. The AO explained that some staﬀ would be required
to report for work without pay, juries would be empaneled without pay, and court-appointed
attorneys would be required to represent their clients without pay. Id.; see also 13 Guide to Judiciary
Policy, ch. 2, §§ 220.25–220.30.55 (2014).
During the 2018–19 shutdown, when the courts were able to operate on nonappropriated
funds, the lapse in appropriations had significant effects on the judiciary’s ability to function.
46 See Armster v. Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1986).
47 Id. at 1430-31.
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without regard to the availability or unavailability of appropriated funds for
the payment of juror fees.”48
Such a proposition is easier said than done. During the 1995 shutdown,
for example, the AO responded by cancelling trainings, reducing travel of
court personnel, and furloughing two-thirds of its staﬀ.49 Some courts
granted motions to continue civil cases, while at least one district court
stopped hearing any new civil jury trials, and an appellate court rescheduled
several arguments because government lawyers could not attend.50 When the
government shut down again later that year, the judiciary relied on
nonappropriated funds, but the concern about the shutdown’s eﬀect on the
courts continued.51 On January 4, 1996, the Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference issued a press release about the funding lapse’s threat to
the judiciary, warning that “[o]ur justice system will be seriously disrupted.”52
In the absence of oﬃcial guidance on the Antideﬁciency Act’s application
to the judiciary, however, there is no reason why (and no practical instruction
on how) the courts should abide such a serious disruption. While the Armster
court abstractly discussed the obligation of courts to continue with their
constitutional duties even when there was no funding to do so, the eﬀects of
the 1995 shutdown make clear that the judicial branch simply cannot function
in the absence of necessary funding. Because the judiciary is a separate,
independent, and co-equal branch of government, the text of the
Antideﬁciency Act cannot be read to constrain it from obtaining the funds
necessary to perform its constitutional function or to excuse the President
from fulﬁlling his or her obligations prescribed by the Take Care Clause.
D. Proposed Solutions—Legislation or Mandamus?
Congress and the President have a constitutional obligation to ensure
that the independent judiciary is funded in spite of their political battles.
The judiciary must be prepared to protect itself in the likely event of a
future shutdown, and we propose two solutions: a congressional solution
and a judicial solution.53 These solutions form the fourth building block
Id. at 1431.
An Inside Look at the Shutdown, THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS (Admin. Oﬃce of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1995, at 1-2.
50 Id. at 2.
51 Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 625, 634 (1997).
52 Id. (quoting Press Release, Exec. Comm. of the Judicial Conference (Jan. 4, 1996)).
53 Though we draw from state precedent in advocating for a legislative solution, we recognize that
state and federal laws differ in significant ways. Although Congress arguably has the power to abolish
lower federal courts, the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates the existence of the judiciary. Compare
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (“[T]he language of the constitution is
not mandatory, and . . . congress may constitutionally omit to vest the judicial power in the courts of
48
49
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in our theory of necessity—that is, how and why the courts must utilize
their inherent power to compel the Legislature to provide funds and/or
compel the President to “take Care” to execute the Constitution.
The preferred solution for funding of the judiciary is through
congressional action. Among Congress’s enumerated powers is the power “to
constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”54 Under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, we contend that Congress may and should designate
funds for the judiciary as separate from any broad appropriations bill.55 This
was the solution advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1995, and it makes
even more sense now in light of the fact that the judiciary appropriation,
which represents only two-tenths of one percent of the overall federal
budget,56 has never been controversial. Just as Congress and the President
have explicitly agreed that certain spending bills, such as for the military,
should go into eﬀect without being held captive by other controversial
issues,57 the judiciary deserves and requires the same.
Alternatively, the judiciary may have to move forward with a judicial
solution, by instituting litigation based on the theory of necessity
expressed in this Essay. Mandamus, as was successfully employed in
Carroll v. Tate, is an appropriate remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 136158 as well
as under the All Writs Act,59 which is “to be used only in the exceptional
case where there is clear abuse of discretion or ‘usurpation of judicial
power.’”60 Though a writ of mandamus has never been issued against the
the United States.”), and Howard, 440 F. Supp. at 1110 (citing H. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953)) (noting that
Congress arguably may eliminate lower federal courts), with Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs, 681 A.2d at
703 (stating that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for the existence of the courts).
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
55 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
56 Hearing on the Supreme Court Budget before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t of the
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Justice Samuel A. Alito). Justice
Alito made a presentation to the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on
March 7, 2019 requesting $90 million for federal courts for the ﬁscal year 2020. Id. at 3.
57 See Li Zhou, What’s Open—and Closed—During a Partial Government Shutdown, VOX (Jan. 19,
2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/20/18136667/partial-governmentshutdown-post-oﬃce-military-passports [https://perma.cc/23LE-5HYN] (explaining that active
duty members of the military are exempt from furloughs and that most military programs had
already been funded by bills passed prior to the 2019 shutdown).
58 Section 1361 reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012). Thus, “if [the President]
neglects or refuses to perform [his duties], he may be compelled by mandamus, in the same
manner as other persons holding offices under the authority of the United States.” Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 141 (1803).
59 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
60 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957) (quoting Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)).

16

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 168: 1

President, the D.C. Circuit held in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Nixon that the district court could issue a writ of mandamus under § 1361
to compel President Nixon to take care that federal legislation mandating
pay adjustments be faithfully executed.61 The D.C. Circuit explained that
“nothing in the Constitution commits to the President the ultimate
authority to construe federal statutes, at least when those statutes concern
federal pay,” and that the Take Care Clause “does not permit the President
to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws
are construed by the judiciary.”62 As we noted above, the courts are rightly
vested with significant power to attain self-preservation—it would be
inconsistent not to apply such a view in this context. And while mandamus
relief may be extraordinary, it is utterly unthinkable—as the D.C. Circuit
agreed in Nixon—that the functionality of the judicial branch should be
subject to the whim of another branch to fulfill its constitutionally
prescribed duties. Based on this precedent, a federal court may mandamus
the President if he or she fails to perform his or her duty under the Take
Care Clause to grant the judiciary reasonable and necessary
appropriations during a shutdown.
CONCLUSION
Using a theory of necessity, and in order to protect its independence,
the federal judiciary must ensure a funding source that is protected from
infighting of the political branches. If not, the next shutdown may result
in a constitutional crisis that is injurious to the nation, the courts, and the
citizenry. With the building blocks identified here, we have demonstrated
how the judiciary can rely on this theory of necessity to avoid such a crisis.
We must not make a scarecrow of the law;
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it

See 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 604 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit’s holding is limited to a court’s ability to
mandamus the President to perform “ministerial” duties. Id. at 616. Federal courts have not yet
addressed whether the President’s duty to “faithfully execute the Laws” to maintain the functioning
of the judiciary is “ministerial.” Academic articles, however, have debated this issue, recognizing the
ambiguity in the Take Care Clause as it constrains the President’s autonomy. Compare Sam Kamin,
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM.
L. 183, 196 (2016) (“[The Take Care Clause] cannot be taken to mean that the federal executive’s
duty to administer the law is merely ministerial[.]”), with Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3,
at 799-800 (“The Take Care Clause is . . . naturally read as an instruction or command to the
President to put the laws into eﬀect . . . .”).
61
62
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Their perch and not their terror.
—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 1.
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